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Entrepreneurship and Firm 
Formation across Countries
Leora Klapper, Raphael Amit, and Mauro F. Guillén
4.1    Introduction
Entrepreneurship is essential for the continued dynamism of the modern 
market economy, and a greater entry rate of new businesses can foster com-
petition and economic growth (Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan 2006; Djankov 
et al. 2002). In this regard, a comprehensive longitudinal study of entrepre-
neurial activity can assess time- varying and time- invariant determinants of 
ﬁ  rm creation and its relationship to economic growth and poverty reduction. 
Furthermore, from an evolutionary economics perspective, new research 
suggests that disparities in economic growth between advanced and less-
  developed countries can narrow, owing precisely to the growth of entrepre-
neurial activity (Galor and Michalopoulos 2006). Empirical data can also 
help us better understand how entrepreneurs interact within their respec-
tive networks, wherein new business ideas are generated and businesses are 
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created (Stuart and Sorenson 2005). Additionally, there is a strong need to 
develop data sets to study how economic and political factors aﬀect entre-
preneurship. For instance, Brander et al. (1998) used a longitudinal data set 
on the evolution of ﬁ  rm formation in Canada to document that economic 
growth is driven by new entry rather than by the growth of existing ﬁ  rms.
This study oﬀers a methodology for collecting data on new business crea-
tion, serving as a ﬁ  rst step in enabling research on the dynamics of entre-
preneurial activity. Furthermore, the data can be used as a benchmark for 
changes in the composition of the private sector and may further advance 
the study of the impact of regulatory, political, macroeconomic, and insti-
tutional changes on entrepreneurship and growth.
We ﬁ nd that business entry and density rates are signiﬁ  cantly related to 
country-  level indicators of economic development and growth, the qual-
ity of the legal and regulatory environment, ease of access to ﬁ  nance, and 
prevalence of informality. In the multivariate panel analyses, we ﬁ  nd that 
the business environment—speciﬁ  cally, the ease of starting a business and 
political corruption—remain signiﬁ  cant indicators of total ﬁ  rm registra-
tions, even after controlling for the level of economic development. These 
results are thus consistent with prior work on the eﬃcient allocation of 
inputs and other resources to entrepreneurial activities (Jovanovic 1982) and 
the impact of regulatory reform (Mullainathan and Schnabl, chapter 5 in 
this volume). We also ﬁ  nd signiﬁ  cantly higher entry rates in countries with 
better governance. Case studies show the impact of political, institutional, 
and tax reforms on new business creation. These results can guide eﬀective 
policymaking and deliver new capabilities for identifying the impact of 
reforms.
4.2      Methodology: How Do We Deﬁ  ne Entrepreneurship?
In order to measure entrepreneurship and make the data universally com-
parable, we developed a methodology that can be applicable across het-
erogeneous legal regimes and economic systems. Previous eﬀorts had been 
made in this regard, but the great majority focused solely on the developed 
world and did not take into account diﬀerences in legal systems, sectors, and 
economic structures (see United Nations [2005]).
The deﬁ  nition of entrepreneurship lacks a common language (Outcalt 
2000). Joseph Schumpeter deﬁ  ned entrepreneurship as “the assumption of 
risk and responsibility in designing and implementing a business strategy or 
starting a business” (Schumpeter 1911). J. W. Gough stated that entrepre-
neurship “refers to a person who undertakes and operates a new enterprise 
or venture, and assumes some accountability for the inherent risks” (Gough 
1969). For practitioners, entrepreneurship has generally been viewed as the 
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discovery, creation, and proﬁ  table exploitation of markets for goods and 
services.1 Therefore, for the purposes of the analysis in this study, entrepre-
neurship is deﬁ  ned as the activities of an individual or a group aimed at initiat-
ing economic activities in the formal sector under a legal form of business.
Notably, this deﬁ  nition excludes informal sector initiatives. This exclusion 
is based on the diﬃculties of quantifying the number of ﬁ  rms in the informal 
sector rather than on its relevance for developing economies (Nielsen and 
Plovsing 1997). The only way to measure the informal sector is through eco-
nomic censuses, which are infrequently collected due to their high costs.
After deﬁ  ning our measure of entrepreneurship, we need to create a stan-
dard unit of measurement. Generally, entrepreneurial activities are carried 
out in the form of a “business.” Statistical agencies around the world deﬁ  ne 
a business in many diﬀerent ways based on the sources of available admin-
istrative data (Vale 2005). Due to the lack of a universally agreed-  upon 
deﬁ  nition of what constitutes a business, agencies have formulated either 
an economic, statistical, or legal deﬁ  nition.2 For instance, the United States 
bases its business statistics on establishments, and Canada reports average 
labor units (ALU),3 while countries reporting to Eurostat4 and the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE)5 use various mea-
sures including legal (enterprises), geographical (local unit), and activity-
  based (kind of activity unit) approaches for their business statistics. As a 
result, the data are not easily comparable across countries: the proposed unit 
of measurement must take into consideration the availability of the data, 
the consistency across countries, the relevance to entrepreneurship, and the 
focus on the formal sector.
Hence, to make the data comparable across a large number of countries, 
the speciﬁ  c type of business measured is simply the number of limited liabil-
ity corporations or its equivalent in other legal systems. There are no clearly 
deﬁ  ned, internationally agreed-  upon, minimum-  sized criteria for business 
activity (United Nations 2005; Hoﬀmann, Larsen, and Oxholm 2006). Fur-
thermore, in many countries, neither ﬁ  nancial information nor the number 
of employees is collected, making it impossible to identify ﬁ  rm size. There-
1. See Shane and Venkataraman (2000) and Venkataraman (1997) for a discussion of alter-
native deﬁ  nitions.
2. At the international level, Eurostat and the OECD have attempted to deﬁ  ne the concept 
of business. Other countries, like the United States, choose the establishment as the main unit 
for business statistical purposes.
3. See the US Census Bureau, available at: http:/ / www.census.gov/ econ/ . Also see the Longitu-
dinal Employment Analysis Program (LEAP) of Statistics Canada, available at: http:/ / strategis.
gc.ca/ epic/ site/ sbrp- rppe.nsf/ en/ rd00827e.html.
4. “Council Regulation (EEC) No 696/  93 of 15 March 1993 on the statistical units for the 
observation and analysis of the production system in the Community,” Oﬃcial Journal L076 
(2003): 1–  11.
5. Terminology on statistical metadata, United Nations Statistical Commission, available at: 
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fore, in this study, we collect information on all corporations, regardless of 
their economic or staﬀ size.
4.2.1      A Focus on the Formal Sector
This study focuses on the size and growth of the formal private sector. 
However, the informal sector (or “shadow economy”) plays an important 
role in many countries, ranging from over 75 percent of oﬃcial gross domes-
tic product (GDP) in Nigeria to about 10 percent in the United States (Sch-
neider and Enste 2000). The previous literature has highlighted the poten-
tial advantages to formal sector participation, including police and judicial 
protection (and less vulnerability to corruption and the demand for bribes), 
access to formal credit institutions, the ability to use formal labor contracts, 
and greater access to foreign markets (Schneider and Enste 2000).6 However, 
because of burdensome regulations, high marginal tax rates, the absence 
of monitoring and compliance (of both registration and tax regulations), 
and other weaknesses in the business environment, many ﬁ  rms might ﬁ  nd it 
optimal to evade regulations and operate in the informal sector. Firms that 
choose to stay small and informal might be unable to realize their full growth 
potential. Our data set allows us to examine the growth of the formal private 
sector relative to the informal sector and to identify factors that encourage 
ﬁ  rms to begin operations in or transitions to the formal sector.
For instance, a large cross-  country study ﬁ  nds that increases in product 
market and labor regulations have been linked to increases in the size of the 
informal sector (Loayza, Oviedo, and Serven 2006). Furthermore, a study 
in the United States ﬁ  nds that increases in the top marginal income tax rate 
and decreases in tax audit probabilities and penalties might increase the 
size of the shadow economy (Cebula 1997). Another cross- country analysis 
ﬁ  nds that entrepreneurs are most likely to operate informally to avoid the 
burdens of bureaucracy and corruption and that increases in regulation—
and importantly, the enforcement of regulations—is associated with larger 
informal sectors (Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-  Lobaton 1998, 1999; 
Friedman et al. 2000). This suggests that regulations can aﬀect the creation 
of new ﬁ  rms, the average size of ﬁ  rms, and the dynamism of incumbent 
ﬁ  rms.7 Our empirical analysis examines the relationship between growth in 
the formal sector and improvements in the tax, regulatory, and governance 
environment.
Evidence on the relationship between the informal sector and economic 
growth is mixed. On the one hand, a larger shadow economy is related to less 
6. The beneﬁ  ts of formal sector registration might vary by industry. This is discussed in 
section 4.5.3.
7. However, informal microenterprises might not lag behind formal microenterprises in terms 
of growth or dynamism; for instance, studies of Latin America suggest that in developing coun-
ties with low levels of formal sector labor productivity, entrepreneurs with low levels of human 
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tax revenue, which might lead to less investment in public infrastructure and 
economic growth, particularly in developing countries (i.e., Loayza 1996). 
On the other hand, evidence in the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD) countries ﬁ  nds that the informal economy 
has a strongly positive eﬀect on consumer purchases of both durable and 
nondurable expenditures and an indirectly positive eﬀect on tax revenue 
and economic growth (Schneider 1998; Bhattacharyya 1999). In our longitu-
dinal analysis, we ﬁ  nd no signiﬁ  cant relationship between economic growth 
and new ﬁ  rm creation, but this might be due to our short panel series.
4.3    Business  Registries
The information presented in this study was collected from business regis-
tries and other government sources in over one hundred countries. The data 
were collected via a survey and follow-  up phone calls. These other sources 
include statistical agencies, tax and labor agencies, chambers of commerce, 
and private vendors (such as Dunn and Bradstreet [D&B]), which were used 
only when business registry data were unavailable or nonexistent.8 While 
this analysis reasserts the great heterogeneity that characterizes these public 
entities in terms of, inter alia, prevailing regulations, methodologies, and the 
implantation of digital administrations, a number of common challenges 
and achievements have been identiﬁ  ed and are described in this section.
Business registries9 are public entities that are generally established by 
commercial-   or business-  code mandates and managed by the ministries of 
commerce or justice (Labariega Villanueva 2006). They are responsible for 
registering businesses, as well as noting any signiﬁ  cant modiﬁ  cations to the 
internal structure of these businesses throughout their life span. The main 
purpose of business registries is to guarantee that businesses comply with 
current regulations and to make such information available to the public. 
Their composition varies greatly across countries, as is amply evidenced by 
the fact that they can either coexist with real estate registries (e.g., Mexico), 
be managed by chambers of commerce or professional associations (e.g., 
Syria), or be stand-  alone agencies (e.g., the United Kingdom).
While the laws for business registrations vary greatly across countries, a 
common thread among all is the “legal entity” element: any business with a 
legal entity (or “corporate personhood”) separate from its owners must be duly 
registered.10 Thus, the deﬁ  nition of what constitutes a separate legal entity in 
a given country is key in deciding which businesses are required to register.
8. A complete list of sources is provided in the appendix.
9. Also called Incorporation Oﬃces (US), Companies Registration Oﬃces (IR), Companies 
House (UK), Business Register (AU), Mercantile Registries (SP), Public Registries of Property 
and Commerce (MEX), Registry of Commerce (FR), etc.
10. The registration of businesses without legal entity (e.g., professional associations, indi-
vidual merchants, etc.) can be voluntary, not compulsory, in some countries (e.g., Spain).134    Leora Klapper, Raphael Amit, and Mauro F. Guillén
The amount of information required to register varies across coun-
tries. However, in general, information is collected during both the 
incorporation/ registration process and the life of the business. For instance, 
at the time of registration, ﬁ  rms are generally required to report the list of 
shareholders and managing directors, the main industrial activity, proof 
of payment of taxes and fees, and proof of compliance with applicable 
business regulations. On an annual basis, many countries require ﬁ  rms to 
report balance sheet and proﬁ  t/  loss accounts and changes in employment. 
Furthermore, during the course of the business life, ﬁ  rms are often required 
to report any changes in share capital, mergers or acquisitions, and any 
insolvency or liquidation proceedings.
However, many countries requiring businesses to ﬁ  le certain data lack the 
ability to enforce compliance. A key case in point is the fact that whereas 65 
percent of the countries surveyed require businesses to record their ﬁ  nan-
cial statements, a signiﬁ  cantly lower percentage actually manage to collect 
the data. The same applies to the reporting of closures: over 80 percent of 
the countries surveyed require notiﬁ  cation of ﬁ  rm closures—either through 
liquidation, bankruptcy, merger, or acquisition—but a large number of 
countries lack the proper mechanisms to enforce this requirement. In sum, 
although information requirements do not vary markedly across countries, 
many registries lack the enforcement mechanisms regarding business ﬁ  ling 
and reporting laws. This further contributes to the signiﬁ  cant diﬀerences in 
the quality of the registration information across countries.
In principle, registries are open to the public; therefore, none of the infor-
mation they contain is regarded as conﬁ  dential.11 Nevertheless, the way in 
which customers access information and the format in which the informa-
tion is presented varies greatly across countries. This variance is mainly a 
function of the degree to which registries have been digitalized and to which 
an eﬃcient accessing framework governing the system exists. For instance, 
when the register has been successfully converted into electronic format, 
the information is generally available to customers through the Internet for 
a small fee. If the country has not made such a transition, the client gener-
ally must go to the registry bureau (which is often decentralized) in person 
and conduct “manual” research on-  site. To complement oﬃcial channels, 
private vendors (e.g., D&B) also distribute registry information in many 
countries.
4.4      Challenges and Data Limitations
Despite the eﬀort made to minimize disparities and make the data compa-
rable across countries, certain limitations preclude a completely systematic 
11. Some countries do not disclose the articles of incorporation or have more restrictive 
legislation because of privacy laws (e.g., Germany).Entrepreneurship and Firm Formation across Countries    1 3 5
analysis of entrepreneurial development. The following subsections rep-
resent the most frequently faced problems in the process of gathering and 
processing the data.
4.4.1    Data  Availability
As previously stated, several countries do not compile data on newly 
created businesses or on ﬁ  rms that went out of business, much less on re- 
registered businesses (i.e., businesses that register existing businesses because 
of changes to ﬁ  rm names, ownership, sector, etc.) A second challenge refers 
to some countries, excluded from this survey, that have in fact collected data 
on enterprise creation but simply do not have the tools or resources to pro-
cess them. In some cases, decentralized business registries make aggregation 
to the national level extremely diﬃcult. In other cases, the data are archived 
only in paper format.
4.4.2    Data  “Purity”
Time series data was carefully examined, since the levels of total and 
newly registered businesses might be inﬂ  ated due to recent legal or eco-
nomic reforms. For instance, Algeria issued a new law requiring all existing 
businesses to re-  register in order to bring their status up to new sectoral 
requirements. As a result, the number of businesses doubled from 1997 to 
1998 (ﬁ  gure 4.1).
4.4.3      Limitations Regarding Data on Firm Closures
As previously stated, although approximately 80 percent of surveyed coun-
tries require businesses to report closures, a signiﬁ  cantly lower number were 
actually able to report the number of closed businesses. The reasons diﬀer 
from country to country but are mainly due to the fact that the registrars 
Fig. 4.1    Legal reforms that aﬀect business statistics: The Algerian case
Source: World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Database (2008).136    Leora Klapper, Raphael Amit, and Mauro F. Guillén
generally have no enforcement mechanisms to obligate businesses to report 
closures. In other cases, the number of closed businesses was reported but 
might be imprecise, because only a low percentage of businesses actually 
report their closure. Although the number of closed companies is essential 
to paint a clear picture of the economic and entrepreneurial activities of a 
country, it is not yet feasible to obtain comparable data (Nucci 1999).12
4.4.4    Shell  Corporations
Shell companies are deﬁ  ned as companies that are registered for tax pur-
poses but are not active businesses. These corporations do not ﬁ  t into the 
methodology of our study, since they do not correspond to the category of 
“entrepreneurship” or to that of “business.” Therefore, we also exclude some 
countries that are internationally recognized tax havens (i.e., Jersey).
4.5    Summary  Statistics
We collected data on the number of new and total businesses for 101 
countries for the maximum time period from 2000 to 2008. The appendix 
provides the complete list of data sources by country. Country-  level data is 
available  at:  http:/ / econ.worldbank.org/ research/ entrepreneurship.
4.5.1      Total Business Density, Entry Density, and Entry Rates
Total business density is calculated as the number of registered businesses 
as a percentage of the active population (aged ﬁ  fteen to sixty-  four) in that 
year. Data are available for 101 countries. The diﬀerences among regions 
are pronounced, as shown in ﬁ  gure 4.2. Business density ranges from an 
average of thirty-  three per thousand in Australia to less than one in many 
low-  income African countries. The highest density is found in the devel-
oped world, with an average of ﬁ  fty-ﬁ  ve businesses for every 1,000 active 
individuals, whereas all the other regions have a density lower than forty 
businesses for every 1,000 active individuals.
Entry density rates are calculated as new ﬁ  rms (those that were registered 
in the current year) as a percentage of the working- age population. The data 
collected for eighty- two countries show signiﬁ  cant disparities across regions, 
ranging from 0.05 percent in Africa and the Middle East to 0.58 percent in 
industrialized countries.
Entry rates are calculated as new registrations of companies as a per-
centage of total (lagged previous year) registered businesses. The data for 
eighty-  two countries, summarized by region, are shown in ﬁ  gure 4.3. On a 
regional level, industrialized countries had the highest entry rates over our 
12. Information on “active” companies—excluding closed or inoperative businesses—is 
available from national tax agencies and labor ministries, although these agencies generally do 
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sample period. Interestingly, the data collected across countries show that 
this indicator presents fewer disparities across regions, ranging from 6.6 
percent to 10 percent.
4.5.2      Business Distribution by Sector
The 2008 survey collected data on the number of total and new businesses 
disaggregated by sector of activity. In order to compare data across regions, 
the classiﬁ  cation was truncated to wholesale and retail trade, ﬁ  nancial and 
real estate, industry, and services. In addition to sectoral diﬀerences across 
levels of economic development, we expect variation across regulatory and 
governance regimes. For instance, we might expect that capital-   and labor-
 intensive industries would be underrepresented in countries with weak ﬁ  nan-
cial development and burdensome labor regulations (Rajan and Zingales 
1998). We should also ﬁ  nd that sectors that have greater needs for formal 
Fig. 4.2    Average business density and entry density rates by region, 2000 to 2008
Source: World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Database (2008).
Fig. 4.3    Average entry rates by region, 2000 to 2008
Source: World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Database (2008).138    Leora Klapper, Raphael Amit, and Mauro F. Guillén
sector registration documents are overrepresented in countries with chal-
lenging business environments.
Indeed, an initial analysis of the data shows an almost perfect asymmetry 
in the business distribution in developing and industrialized countries (ﬁ  gure 
4.4). While in developing countries, the retail and ﬁ  nance sectors are twice 
as big as in the industrialized countries, the industry and services sectors are 
half their size. Approximately the same distribution was found among new 
business created in 2004 (not shown). An in-  depth study would be neces-
sary to better understand why entrepreneurs focus so disproportionably on 
certain sectors in developing countries. Nevertheless, a preliminary anal-
ysis might suggest the relatively lower requirements of investment, human 
resources, knowledge, and capital as among the reasons that entrepreneurs 
in developing countries focus on the retail sector. In addition, in developing 
countries with costly and timely barriers to starting a business, only ﬁ  rms 
in wholesale and retail trade might have the greatest incentive to formally 
register—for instance, in order to receive a value added tax (VAT) number, 
which might be required for domestic and international sales.13
4.6    Empirical  Analysis
In this section, we examine various macroeconomic, ﬁ  nancial, political, 
and regulatory indicators that might be related to business density and entry 
Fig. 4.4    Total business distribution by sector, 2006
Source: World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Database (2008).
13. We are unable to control for sectoral distribution in our empirical analysis, since the data 
are only available for a small subsample of countries and was not collected over time. However, 
we expect changes in the distribution to be related to economic development and improvements 
in the business environments, which are measured by our explanatory variables.Entrepreneurship and Firm Formation across Countries    1 3 9
rates. Although we ﬁ  nd signiﬁ  cant relationships with these measures—that is, 
more dynamic economies in countries with better business environments—
we cannot postulate on the direction of causality. We plan to continue to col-
lect this data over time and construct time series of private- sector entry and 
growth that will allow us to study the country characteristics that determine 
entrepreneurship and the eﬀect of regulatory and institutional reforms.
4.6.1      Importance of the Business Environment
Several results highlight the importance of the business environment for 
the growth and development of the private sector. For instance, the 2009 
Doing Business Report includes a ranking (from 1 to 175) of an “ease of 
doing business index,” which measures the relative strength of the regula-
tory environment as conducive to the operation of business. The index is 
constructed as the simple average of the countries’ percentile rankings on ten 
topics: starting a business, dealing with licenses, employing workers, register-
ing property, getting credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, trading across 
borders, enforcing contracts, and closing a business. We ﬁ  nd a negative and 
signiﬁ  cant relationship between the ease of starting a business with entry 
and new ﬁ  rm density rates per country (ﬁ  gure 4.5).
More speciﬁ  cally, barriers to starting a business are signiﬁ  cantly and 
negatively correlated with business density and the entry rate. For example, 
the fewer the procedures required and the shorter the number of days to 
start a business, the greater the number of registered ﬁ  rms—and the higher 
the entry rate (ﬁ  gure 4.6). There is also a signiﬁ  cant relationship between 
Fig.  4.5  New  ﬁ  rm density rates versus ease of doing business rankings by country, 
average 2000 to 2008
Source: World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Database (2008) and Doing Business Database 
(2009).140    Leora Klapper, Raphael Amit, and Mauro F. Guillén
the cost of starting a business (as a percentage of gross national income 
[GNI]) and business density and the entry rate (not shown). For example, 
for every 10 percentage-  point decrease in entry costs, density and the entry 
rate increase by about 1 percentage point.14
4.6.2      Economic and Financial Development
The data also show a positive and signiﬁ  cant relationship between eco-
nomic and ﬁ  nancial development and entrepreneurship. The log of GDP 
per capita and domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP 
(not shown) are both positively and signiﬁ  cantly correlated with business 
and entry density rates (ﬁ  gure 4.7). Furthermore, greater business entry is 
also related to higher entry density rates (as shown by the relative “bubble” 
size). This suggests that greater business opportunities and better access to 
ﬁ  nance are related to a more robust private sector.
Disentangling the direction of causality—whether positive economic 
growth is a determinant for the creation (i.e., registration) of new busi-
nesses or whether greater entrepreneurship leads to economic growth and 
innovation—is an important area of future research.
Fig. 4.6    Business creation and the number of procedures and time to start a busi-
ness by country, average 2000 to 2008
Source: World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Database (2008) and Doing Business Database 
(2009).
14. Countries with entry costs greater than 40 percent of GNI per capita are excluded.Entrepreneurship and Firm Formation across Countries    1 4 1
4.6.3      Relationship with the Informal Sector
Total ﬁ  rm registrations are signiﬁ  cantly higher in countries with a smaller 
informal sector (ﬁ  gure 4.8). This suggests a substitution eﬀect and a larger 
informal sector in countries with higher entry barriers. The data also show a 
signiﬁ  cant (but smaller) relationship between the entry rate and the informal 
sector.
Together, these results suggest that an increase in total and newly registered 
ﬁ  rms might indicate a decrease in the size of the informal sector. Indeed, a 
30 percentage-  point increase in business density and a 10 percentage-  point 
increase in entry rates are commensurate with a 10 percentage- point decline 
in the informal sector (as a share of GDP). We do not include this variable 
in the multivariate analysis because of its very large (about 80 percent) and 
signiﬁ  cant relationship with GDP per capita.
4.6.4      Business Creation and Governance
In order to study the relation between governance and entrepreneurship, 
we use the average of the six Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2006) gov-
ernance indices: voice and accountability, political stability, government 
eﬀectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. The 
data show a strong and signiﬁ  cant relationship between entry rates and good 
governance (ﬁ  gure 4.9).
This result suggests that a stable business environment should be expected 
to foster private- sector development and growth. The case of Peru shows the 
sensitivity of new ﬁ  rm registrations to political changes (ﬁ  gure 4.10).
Fig.  4.7  New  ﬁ  rm density, GDP per capita, and total business density (“bubble”) 
by country, average 2000 to 2008
Source: World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Database (2008) and World Bank (2009).Fig. 4.8    Business creation and the informal sector by country, average 2000 
to 2008
Source: World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Database (2008) and World Bank (2006).
Fig. 4.9    Entry rates and Kaufmann et al. (2006) governance indicators by country, 
average 2000 to 2008
Source: World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Database (2008) and World Bank (2008).Entrepreneurship and Firm Formation across Countries    1 4 3
Case-  based evidence also suggests that government policy in the areas 
of taxation and enforcement can have a large impact on business regis-
trations. For instance, in the posttransitional period (1992 to 1996), the 
Ukraine imposed high marginal tax rates, tax legislation was vague and 
nonspeciﬁ  c (i.e., included complex exemptions and deductions), regulators 
did not enforce compliance, and the system was perceived as unfair and 
corrupt (Kravchuk 2002). However, in July 1996, the government enacted a 
simpliﬁ  ed procedure for patenting many types of entrepreneurial activities, 
and in September 1998, it enacted a simpliﬁ  ed (uniﬁ  ed) system of taxation, 
accounting, and reporting for small business entities (with less than ﬁ  fty 
employees and less than 1 million UAH in revenue).15 These reforms have 
contributed to the increase in new small business registrations (ﬁ  gure 4.11). 
Interestingly, the increase in registrations of new small enterprises happened 
mostly due to the establishment of newly operating enterprises—91.7 per-
cent in 2004—rather than the splitting of larger enterprises (1.12 percent in 
2004), established to take advantage of the small business tax exemptions.
Taxation levels have also been found to be related to new ﬁ  rm formation 
in developed countries. For instance, a study of manufacturing- ﬁ  rm registra-
tions in Spain’s ﬁ  fty provinces between 1981 and 1995 found a correlation 
of –  15.3 percent (marginally signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level) between 
the number of new registrations per capita and production taxes. The cor-
Fig. 4.10    Entrepreneurship and political stability: The Peruvian case
Source: World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Database (2008) and World Bank (2009).
Note: Bars show the year-  on-  year percentage increase of new businesses.
15. Law of Ukraine, “On Patenting Certain Kinds of Entrepreneurial Activity,” July 1, 1996; 
Decree of the President of Ukraine, “On the Simpliﬁ  ed System of Taxation, Accounting and 
Reporting for Small Business Entities,” September 9, 1998.144    Leora Klapper, Raphael Amit, and Mauro F. Guillén
relation with provincial per capita income, by contrast, was 47.3 percent 
(Sánchez Moral 2005, 114–  27).
4.6.5      Multivariate Analysis Using the Panel Data
We use as predictors of entrepreneurial activity the country character-
istics deﬁ  ned in table 4.1. The sample for the analysis is a pooled, cross-
 sectional, longitudinal, unbalanced panel of 197 observations across seventy-
  six countries, with nonmissing explanatory variables for 2003, 2004, and 
2005.16 We use three measures of entrepreneurship as our dependent vari-
ables: business density, entry rates, and entry per capita, which is deﬁ  ned 
as new ﬁ  rms as a percentage of the active population. While entry rates 
proxy new company formation compared to the existing stock of existing 
companies, entry per capita captures new company formation relative to 
the population, thus capturing the extent to which a country was entre-
preneurial during a given year, regardless of the previous (or cumulative) 
history of net company formation. Thus, it measures a diﬀerent aspect of 
entrepreneurial activity.
Our explanatory variables include three indicators of the business envi-
ronment, which vary over time. First, we proxy the barriers to entry by the 
number of procedures to start a business and the rigidity of employment 
index and by an indicator of governance. We control in all analyses for policy 
stability, the ratio of domestic credit to GDP, and GDP per capita.
Fig. 4.11    Number of small businesses in Ukraine (1,000s)
Source: National Statistics, Ukraine (2005).
16. We exclude from this analysis six countries that are not included in the Doing Business 
Database. We use this shorter period of time because of the maximum coverage of registration 
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Table 4.2 shows the correlation matrix, with asterisks identifying statisti-
cal signiﬁ  cance. These univariate tests show that business density (column 
[3]) is signiﬁ  cantly related to all country characteristics; however, entry rates 
are more sensitive to the business environment and governance. We also ﬁ  nd 
large and signiﬁ  cant correlations among our dependent variables.
We use two diﬀerent estimation methods: random- eﬀects generalized least 
squares (GLS) and population-  averaged generalized estimating equations 
(GEE). In the latter, a year trend was added as a control. In ﬁ  xed eﬀects spec-
iﬁ  cations (not shown), most of the variation in the sample was accounted 
for by the country dummies, thus providing no additional insight into the 
determinants of new ﬁ  rm registrations.
Table 4.3 presents the regression results based on the panel data. We ﬁ  nd 
that entry rates are signiﬁ  cantly related to better governance, even after con-
trolling for GDP per capita. This ﬁ  nding is robust to the estimation method 
used (i.e., GLS or GEE). This suggests that government corruption and 
enforcement is the driving force in the decision of entrepreneurs to join the 
formal sector. Next, we ﬁ  nd that entry per capita is signiﬁ  cantly related to the 
number of entry procedures, access to ﬁ  nance, and economic development. 
This measure of new ﬁ  rm formation is independent of the previous history 
of entrepreneurship; hence, it is not surprising that GDP per capita turns out 
to be an important predictor. Finally, we ﬁ  nd that business density is strongly 
Table 4.1  Deﬁ  nitions and summary statistics, panel of seventy-  six countries, 2003 to 2005
Variable   Observations   Description   Mean  
Standard 
deviation
Entry 197 New registered corporations during year t 
    divided by existing stock of corporations 




197 New registered corporations during year t 




197 Stock of corporations as of end of year t 




197 Log of number of entry procedures (Doing




197 Rigidity of employment index (Doing 
 Business  Database)
36.97 16.85
Governance 197 Average of governance indicators 
  (Kaufmann et al. 2006)
0.33 1.00
Domestic credit
 (%  GDP)
197 Domestic credit divided by GDP (World 






Log of GDP per capita, purchasing power 
    parities, 2000 international dollars 
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and signiﬁ  cantly related to lower barriers to entry and better governance (in 
the GEE model). These ﬁ  ndings spotlight the importance of the business 
environment in formal private-  sector development and growth.17
4.7      Business Registries and Electronic Business Registration (EBR)
Many governments have taken action to make it easier for entrepreneurs 
to start a new ﬁ  rm, such as deregulating and automating the registration pro-
cess, which can reduce time and cost for entrepreneurs.18 A larger number of 
formally registered ﬁ  rms is associated with a smaller informal sector, which 
Table 4.3  Regressions predicting entry rates and density, panel of seventy-  six countries, 2003 
to 2005
Entry Entry per capita Density
[GLS] [GEE] [GLS] [GEE] [GLS] [GEE]
    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)
Procedures –0.0080 –0.0044 –5.0875 –8.6206 –1.6417 –1.2862
[–0.96] [–0.53] [–1.84]∗ [–1.62] [–3.06]∗∗∗ [–1.94]∗
Rigidity employment –0.0003 –0.0002 –0.1003 –0.0577 –0.0125 –0.0232
[–1.11] [–0.83] [–0.81] [–0.34] [–0.64] [–1.11]
Governance 0.0125 0.0178 –1.9257 3.8461 0.6388 1.3942
[1.85]∗ [2.56]∗∗ [–0.62] [0.78] [1.21] [2.31]∗∗
Domestic credit –0.0001 –0.0001 0.0665 0.0278 0.0008 –0.0045
[–1.49] [–1.61] [2.15]∗∗ [0.50] [0.14] [–0.65]
GDP per capita 0.0058 0.0028 16.4294 10.9955 1.1195 0.6106
[1.00] [0.48] [5.10]∗∗∗ [2.51]∗∗ [2.24]∗∗ [1.15]
Year 0.0047 1.0996 0.2736
[3.94]∗∗∗ [1.62] [3.17]∗∗∗
Constant 0.0682 –9.4265 –101.469 –2,250.14 –3.0723 –547.17
[1.31] [3.91]∗∗∗ [–3.45]∗∗∗ [–1.66]∗ [–0.68] [–3.17]∗∗∗
Observations 197 197 197 197 197 197
R2 0.19 0.32 0.34
Wald 2       38.89∗∗∗       56.42∗∗∗       63.67∗∗∗
Source: World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Database and World Bank (2007).
Note: Variables are deﬁ  ned in table 4.1; z-  scores are shown in brackets beneath regression coeﬃcient.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.
17. We also added the corporate tax rate and the GDP growth rate to assess the impact of 
taxation and the business cycle, respectively. These two variables were not signiﬁ  cant in any of 
the models. We also added to the models in table 4.3 the interaction between GDP per capita 
and governance. This term reached signiﬁ  cance, with a positive sign, only in model (5). How-
ever, the main eﬀect of governance continued to be insigniﬁ  cant. This evidence seems to indicate 
that good governance is especially conducive to higher density in high-  income countries.
18. Cross-  country data on the cost, time, and number of procedures required to register a 
business is available in the Doing Business report, available at: www.doingbusiness.org.148    Leora Klapper, Raphael Amit, and Mauro F. Guillén
is associated with slower growth and employment and lower tax revenue.19 
Furthermore, formal sector registration provides ﬁ  rms access to a VAT sales 
ID, which oﬀers greater domestic and international sales opportunities. Leg-
islative reforms to the registration process have been shown in countries 
around the world to increase entry and small business employment (i.e., 
Mexico and Russia).20 An example of legislative reform to encourage formal 
entrepreneurship and the growth of new and small ﬁ  rms is to introduce on- 
line electronic registration systems. Automating the registration process also 
helps provide lenders, suppliers, and customers greater access to information 
on the ﬁ  nancial health, management, and ownership of registered ﬁ  rms, 
which encourages greater access to ﬁ  nancing and growth.
In order to have a better understanding of the business registration pro-
cess and the impact of diﬀerent typologies of registries in the ease of doing 
business, the 2008 World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Survey added a 
special section related to the business registries. Seventy-  ﬁ  ve countries par-
ticipated in this section, providing valuable information about the registra-
tion processes, information requirements, and the availability of e- registries 
and e-  distribution, among other issues.
4.7.1    Business  Registry  Typology
In order to assess the diﬀerent degrees of modernization of business reg-
istries, the survey collected information on the availability of electronic reg-
istration, which broadly includes the automation and computerization of 
local registrars, the ability to register over the Internet, and the electronic dis-
tribution of data via the Internet. However, this does not necessarily include 
on- line authentication or integration of e- government services.21 Figure 4.12 
shows the deep disparity found between industrialized and developing coun-
tries. While on average, only 32 percent of developing countries have imple-
mented an electronic registry, more than 80 percent of the industrialized 
countries have already achieved complete automation. However, in most 
regions, over 60 percent of countries make registrar information available 
over the Internet. This discrepancy might be explained by the fact that elec-
tronic distribution is less expensive and less diﬃcult to implement and does 
not require electronic signature or security laws or complex e-  government 
platforms.
Moreover, the registries were questioned on the information that busi-
nesses were required to ﬁ  le, as well as on any other information they reg-
19. For example, see Djankov et al. (2002).
20. See Kaplan, Piedra, and Seira (2007) and Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya (2007) for studies 
on the eﬀect of registration reform on entrepreneurship in Mexico and Russia, respectively.
21. For further information on EBR, see A. Lewin, L. Klapper, B. Lanvin, D. Satola, S. 
Sirtaine, R. Symonds and C. Zappala, “Implementing Electronic Business Registry (e-  BR) 
Services: Recommendations for Policy Makers Based on the Experience of EU Accession 
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istered besides business incorporations. We ﬁ  nd deep disparities among 
regions (not shown). When it comes to the information the companies are 
required to register, the majority of them oblige businesses to report clo-
sures and annual ﬁ  nancial statements. Nevertheless, not all countries have 
the mechanisms to enforce these requirements. In addition, while business 
registries in industrialized countries tend to stand alone, and only in some 
cases do they register Internet domains, developing countries tend to have 
registries where businesses, real estate, Internet domains, and patent regis-
trations coexist.
4.7.2      Impact of e-  Registry on the Ease of Doing Business
Once the typology of the registry is deﬁ  ned, the survey then aims to under-
stand how diﬀerent typologies impact entrepreneurship and the ease of 
doing business. In this regard, the data show that countries with e-  registries 
tend to have shorter incorporation time frames, with less bureaucratic and 
cheaper procedures. For instance, the cost of incorporating a new business 
(as a percentage of gross national income [GNI] per capita) is on aver-
age almost 50 percent lower in countries with e-  registries, as shown in ﬁ  g-
ure 4.13.
4.7.3      Impact of e-  Registration on Entry Rates
The data also reveal a signiﬁ  cant role of modernized business registries 
in facilitating business creation. We ﬁ  nd higher entry rates—deﬁ  ned as the 
number of new registrations divided by the stock of existing registrations—
in those countries with e-  registries compared to the ones without them. 
However, we cannot dismiss reverse causality—that is, that registry mod-
ernization is demand driven by a more robust private sector.
Fig. 4.12    Electronic business registration by region
Source: World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Database (2008).150    Leora Klapper, Raphael Amit, and Mauro F. Guillén
4.7.4      The Impact of Electronic Registration: 
Guatemala, Sri Lanka, and Jordan
The modernization of business registries is an important step in a suc-
cessful private-  sector development strategy. If appropriate political and 
economical reforms take place, the country will require an eﬃcient regis-
try that can satisfy new businesses’ demands. Otherwise, the registry will 
become a bottleneck for entrepreneurs, not only encumbering the business 
creation process but also discouraging the transition between the informal 
and formal sectors.
Our data suggest that the modernization process of business registries is 
usually a long process framed inside a larger national private- sector develop-
ment strategy. On average, countries draft ﬁ  ve-  year plans, and the goal is to 
implement electronic registration and distribution.
The data suggest a relationship between the implementation of electronic 
registration and an increase in the number of new businesses registered. 
Countries like Slovenia, Guatemala, Azerbaijan, Jordan, Oman, and Sri 
Lanka had increases of more than 30 percent in new density rates after the 
full implementation of electronic registries (ﬁ  gure 4.14). These increases 
cannot be attributed solely to the improvements in the countries’ business 
registries, but it can be stated that the modernization of their business reg-
istries was the culmination of a successful implementation of regulatory 
reforms that when taken together produced a signiﬁ  cant and positive impact 
in the ease of doing business in these countries.
For example, Guatemala began its modernization plan in 1996, achiev-
ing e-  registration and e-  distribution in 1999. Jordan, following a 1997 law, 
created a new entity in charge of business registration and entrepreneurship 
Fig. 4.13    e-  Registration and the investment climate
Source: World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Database (2008).Entrepreneurship and Firm Formation across Countries    1 5 1
promotion that fully implemented the electronic registration in 2002. Sri 
Lanka, on the other hand, partially implemented its electronic business reg-
istration in 2001 in order to prepare for the new Companies Act of 2007.
In addition, in several countries, the business registry has played a cen-
tral role in private-  sector development strategies. Instead of being a passive 
actor, the registries have in many cases been entrusted with the task of fos-
tering entrepreneurship through a variety of activities. Among others tasks, 
they provide an advisory role in training potential entrepreneurs, they are 
in charge of the dissemination of information, they promote foreign invest-
ment, they reduce bureaucratic barriers, and so on.
Since the creation of the business registry of Guatemala in 1971, its 
structure remained almost unchanged for two decades. An average of seven 
employees and a couple of mechanical typewriters composed its organiza-
tional structure until 1995. In 1996, under a new administration, the business 
registry undertook an ambitious modernization plan. The initial program, 
divided into four phases, would be accomplished with the implementation 
of e-  registry and e-  distribution in 1999 (ﬁ  gure 4.15).
The plan included not only the modernization of the business registry 
but also the entrustment of the registry as the central actor for the new 
private-  sector development strategy. The registry would gain an active role 
in the promotion of entrepreneurship through activities such as the train-
ing of entrepreneurs, investment promotion, dissemination, and so forth. 
As shown in ﬁ  gure 4.2, the modernization of the business registry and the 
new economic policies had a direct impact on the number of new businesses 
registered, with an increase of 40 percent on new registrations. In compari-
son, the three-  year period (2000 to 2003) during which the modernization 
Fig. 4.14    Impact of e-  registration implementation
Source: World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Database (2008).152    Leora Klapper, Raphael Amit, and Mauro F. Guillén
strategy was paralyzed due to a change in the administration resulted in a 
sharp 11 percent decline in the number of new businesses registered.
In 2003, the new administration reactivated the second modernization 
plan for the business registry. A number of new and ambitious goals were 
deﬁ  ned, such as an increase in the number of registration locations, the 
reduction of necessary steps for business incorporation, and the promotion 
of foreign investment. This second stage had a remarkable impact on the 
number of new businesses incorporated and increased the number of new 
businesses registered per year by almost 25 percent. Moreover, the number 
of monthly electronic transactions—including incorporations, closures, re- 
registrations, and consultations—has climbed to over 3,400, representing 
more than 50 percent of the total number of monthly transactions.
4.8    Conclusion
The 2008 World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Survey provides a new 
set of indicators to study the relationship between business creation, the 
investment climate, and economic development. Preliminary ﬁ  ndings sug-
gest that a higher level of entrepreneurship signiﬁ  cantly relates to greater 
economic development, formal sector participation, and better governance. 
For instance, countries with lower barriers to entry and less corruption gen-
erally see higher percentages of ﬁ  rm registrations and entry. Consistent with 
the ﬁ  ndings of Brander et al. (1998) for the Canadian economy, we ﬁ  nd that 
in the eighty- two countries included in our analysis, entrepreneurship—mea-
sured both in terms of new registrations and entry rates—is also positively 
correlated with economic growth. This might suggest that countries that 
facilitate entrepreneurship see commensurate increases in overall economic 
Fig. 4.15    EBR implementation in Guatemala
Source: World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Database (2008).Entrepreneurship and Firm Formation across Countries    1 5 3
growth and an expansion of the formal sector. Alternatively, it might be the 
case that periods of economic expansion encourage optimism and entrepre-
neurship; for instance, individuals might be willing to leave their job security 
to start a business if they are more conﬁ  dent they could ﬁ  nd another job if 
their business fails. We hope to continue collecting data on ﬁ  rm creation over 
time, which will allow us to better understand how the private sector behaves 
over business and ﬁ  nancial cycles. The current data limitations prevent us 
from observing the evolution of new entrants over time in order to assess 
their longevity and their growth. Furthermore, entrepreneurship indicators 
can be used to complement other World Bank group indicators—such as the 
Doing Business indicators—in the development of policy recommendations 
to promote private-  sector development and growth.
In addition, the data collected could become the base for further studies 
in business ecology. For instance, the distribution of businesses per sector 
could be used for a deeper research paper aimed to answer questions such 
as which kind of businesses are easier to incorporate in challenging business 
environments, which sectors are interdependent on one another, and which 




Albania  Boga and Associates, Attorneys at Law
Algeria    Centre National du Registre du Com-
merce
Argentina INDEC
Armenia  National Statistical Service
Australia  Business Demographics Section
Austria  Bundesministerium für Justiz
Azerbaijan  Ministry of Justice
Bangladesh    Registrar of Joint Stock Companies and 
Firms (RJSC)
Belgium Business  Register
Bolivia  Fundación para el Desarollo Empresarial
Bosnia and Herzegovina  IFC
Botswana  Registrar of Companies
Canada Statistics  Canada
Chile  Servicio de Impuestos Internos
China    Ministry of Commerce, State Administra-
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Colombia Confecamaras
Congo, Democratic Republic  Djunga and Risasi, Attorneys at Law
Costa Rica  Registro Nacional
Croatia  Financial Agency (FINA)
Curacao  Curaçao Chamber of Commerce
Cyprus    Ministry of Commerce, Industry and 
Tourism
    Department of Registrar of Companies 
and Oﬃcial Receiver
Czech Republic    Ministry of Justice, Czech Statistical 
Oﬃce
Denmark Danmarks  Statistik
Egypt  Commercial Registry Authority
El Salvador  Dirección del Registro de Comercio
Estonia    Centre of Registers, Ministry of Justice of 
Estonia
Finland Business  Register
France    Institut National de le Statistique et des 
Etudes Economiques
Georgia  Ministry of Economic Development
Germany Statistisches  Bundesamt
Ghana   Registrar- General’s  Department,  Ministry 
of Justice
Greece  Athens Chamber of Commerce (ACCI)
Guatemala Registro  Mercantil
Haiti  Direction Général des Impôts (DGI)
Hong Kong, China    Companies Registry, Inland Revenue 
 Department
Hungary    Hungarian Central Statistical Oﬃce, 
  Business Register Unit
Iceland Statistics  Iceland
India    Dun and Bradstreet Information Services 
India Private   Limited
Indonesia  Ministry of Trade
Ireland  Companies Registration Oﬃce
Israel  Registry of Companies
Italy InfoCamere
Jamaica  Registry of Companies
Japan  Ministry of Justice
Jordan  Companies Control Department
Kazakhstan    Agency of Statistics of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan
Kenya  Iseme, Kamau and Maena Advocates
Latvia  Ministry of JusticeEntrepreneurship and Firm Formation across Countries    1 5 5
Lebanon  Etude Badri et Salim El Meouchi
Lithuania    State Enterprise Center of Registers, 
  Department of Register of Legal 
 Entities
Luxembourg  Répertoire des Entreprises
Macedonia, FYR  Macedonia Statistics Oﬃce
Madagascar    Direction Générale Statistique, Ministère 
de l’économie, des ﬁ  nances et du 
budget
Malawi Registry  General
Malta  Registrar of Companies
Mexico  Mexican Statistical Agency and Labor 
Ministry
Moldova  State Registration Chamber
Morocco Oﬃce Marocain de la Propriété
Mozambique    National Director of the Registry and 
 Notary  Oﬃces,   Central Investment 
Center
The Netherlands    Dutch Association of Chambers of 
 Commerce
New Zealand  New Zealand Companies Oﬃce
Nigeria Corporate  Aﬀairs Commission
Norway Brønnøysundregistrene
Oman    Company Registrar’s Oﬃce, Department 
of Industry
Pakistan  Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC)
Panama  Instituto Nacional de Estadistica
Peru  Ministerio de Economia y Finanzas
Poland World  Bank
Portugal    Centro de Formação dos Registos e do 
Notariado, Ministry of Justice
Romania    Registrar of Corporations, Oﬃce of the 
Attorney General
Russia  Russian SME Resource Center
Senegal    Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la 
Démographie (ANSD)
Serbia and Montenegro    Department for Statistical Registers and 
Standards Accounting and Corporate 
Regulatory Authority (ACRA)
Singapore    Business Statistics Division, Singapore 
Department of   Statistics
Slovak Republic    Analyses and Information Service Unit, 
Statistical Oﬃce of the Slovak Republic156    Leora Klapper, Raphael Amit, and Mauro F. Guillén
Slovenia AJPES
South Africa    Companies and Intellectual Property 
 Registration  Oﬃce
Spain  Registro Mercantil Central de Madrid
Sri Lanka    Board of Investment of Sri Lanka, 
  Registrar of Companies
Sweden  Swedish Companies Registration Oﬃce
Switzerland  Eidg, Amt für das Handelsregister
Syria  Federation of Syrian Chambers of 
 Commerce
Tanzania    Business Registration and Licensing 
 Authority  (BRELA)
Thailand World  Bank
Togo    Direction Générale de la Statistique et de 
la Comptabilité Nationale du Togo
Tunisia  Répertoire National d’entreprises
Turkey  Turkish Statistical Institute 
 (TURKSTAT)
Uganda  Registrar General’s Department
Ukraine  State Statistics Committee of Ukraine
United Kingdom    International Relations Manager at the 
Companies House
United States  D&B
Yemen  Deputy Minister for Trade Aﬀairs
Zambia World  Bank
Zimbabwe   Oﬃce of the Chief Registry of Deeds and 
Companies, Ministry of Justice
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